[E1699] Goehring & Rozencwajg confirms Hormuz was 'effectively closed' as of March 11, disrupting ~20m b/d of crude and ~10 bcf/d of LNG. Brent moved from $59.96 on Jan 7 to $119.50 on March 9 before easing to ~$90.
[E1698] Lyn Alden notes Hormuz has been effectively closed for >2 weeks, disrupting ~20% of global oil/liquids. Dubai physical oil is already trading ~$140 vs futures near $100. Prolonged disruption remains the biggest market tail risk.
[E1697] Luke Gromen sees Liberation Day 2025 tariff shock as a dress rehearsal—stocks, dollar, and bonds all fell simultaneously. His base case is a big downward 'whoosh' 3-6 months away depending on how long Hormuz remains closed.
[E1696] FFTT warns western investors are complacent about war duration; the conflict could last until September. Foreign nations holding $9.4T in USTs may be forced to sell to finance energy deficits if oil spikes above $150.
[E1695] FFTT argues Hormuz has been closed for 10 days, the US is running low on missile interceptors, and if tanker transit remains impaired for another 1-2 weeks, western equity and bond markets will suffer severe damage. Iran doesn't need to defeat the US military—just break the Treasury market.
[E1382] Market is pricing war and stagflation right now = energy + food + dollar. Best guess is low in September.
[E1301] Unlikely to be over quickly. Trump's 'tacos' have been buying time while troops get in place, and escalation always happens outside market hours.
[E1300] The war goes until IRGC is no longer in power, which would have very serious impact on global economy and supply chains. Doesn't see how Trump can exit before midterms.
[E1252] US troops will be sitting ducks on Kharg island. If Iranian missile capabilities are as described, US cannot keep that island. Question is whether regime is crazy enough to blow up US troops when they sit motionless on flat island.
[E1029] The Middle East conflict has disrupted traditional bond-equity correlation, creating an environment where higher inflation expectations limit bonds' ability to protect against equity declines. Authors raise commodity exposure to 15% from 10% while reducing equities.
[E1028] Article thesis: the true risk to the US economy is a 1990-style cyclical downturn triggered by surging Middle East energy prices, which could paralyse the Federal Reserve and squeeze real incomes.
[E1027] Brent above $110, WTI at $97, creating textbook wartime macro regime. US2Y moved from 3.4% to 4% in weeks. S&P has broken its 200-day MA. Energy stocks (XOP, OIH, XLE) up 37-47% YTD while software/crypto down 23%+.
[E348] Trump's market-calming pronouncements are having diminishing impact. If this drags on for a few more weeks, US bond markets and economy will be in serious trouble.
[E272] Opportunistic short-term trade would be NZD/AUD with NZ short. Also agreed that shorting cable (GBP/USD) cheaply and holding the position — someday in next year likely to make out bigly.
[E249] Things can change quickly if it looks like Dems will take both chambers.
[E155] Russian note perspective: EU not self-sufficient in hydrocarbons. Where will they buy when Gulf supplies unreliable and Russian imports off-limits? Energy-intensive industries will relocate to US.
[E150] Friend senior at Vitol says things are very tight. They are tracking US Marines on way to Hormuz. Posits they may take Kharg island to neuter Iranian regime and hand oil control to US.
[E135] Trump thought he could pull off quick regime change like Venezuela. It was a strategic miscalculation with huge implications.
[E133] The impact of war on US economy and Trump's base has been negative. Sending more ships and troops to the Persian Gulf indicates they're not planning to declare victory and cut out.
[E129] Reports Q1 2026 Bitcoin rout exacerbated by Middle East conflict. Gold correcting on profit-taking and dollar strength amid geopolitical uncertainty.
[E128] 42 Macro says whether liquidity pullback is transitory or trending breakdown depends on POTUS, Department of War, and how much they care about midterm and 2028 elections. The longer US-Israel-Iran war persists, greater the reduction in liquidity and decline in asset markets.
[E57] Israel is 'off the leash' and will not stop. The conflict won't be quick. Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen will suffer from presence of Hezbollah, IRGC, and Houthis respectively.
[E51] IRGC attack on neighboring GCC was a massive violation of the region's sovereign social contract. Elimination of IRGC is a prerequisite for regime substitution with civilian rather than religious or military makeup.
[E50] The neighboring GCC attacks were tragically genius move by IRGC and logical from both rational and irrational standpoint - didn't see it coming.
[E45] Bought USD/JPY today, betting war goes longer than market expects.
[E44] Made YouTube video on war trading: long energy via oil majors, short S&P500 & NASDAQ, long food (corn, wheat, soy), and short bonds.
[E32] US and Russia are winners of all this. Europe, Korea, Japan, India, China losing.
[E24] Midterm outcome with increasing probability can't be good for crypto. If it looks like Dems will take both chambers, things can change quickly.
[E14] Believes Israel said they were going in and US had to follow (hence shoddy Situation Room and Trump in Mar-a-Lago). Doubts this has been structured or planned, hence no identifiable objectives or goals.
[E11] No scenario US and Israel can eliminate IRGC without massive boots on ground. IRGC isn't an army in a base - hundreds of thousands of armed zealots integrated into every corner of country. US stepped in bear trap chasing Israel, now stuck, ill-prepared.
[E10] Years long civil war has to be base case. Whoever 'wins' will be embattled by the loser or coalition of factions - queue Syria roadmap. Very rough country to pacify with a lot of rural hardline support.
[E9] Russia and China want this to last as long as possible - they supplied Iran with advanced weapons like hypersonic torpedoes and are using conflict for data gathering on US capabilities. At some point Trump may employ pullout game since not interested in nation building. Iran could fall into civil war.
[E7] BCA have made public a dashboard tracking Hormuz crisis impact.
[E4] JPM Cembalest slides 14-20 show where prices would adjust if conflict stretches past 30 days, with analysis of which countries affected at what level.
[E3] References Citrini's '20 million barrel problem' analysis on Hormuz impact.
[E2] Saxo strategist compared Hormuz disruption to Archduke assassination or Pearl Harbor. If unpassable for balance of month, enormous knock-on issues. NZ, Japan, South Korea extremely vulnerable - not enough stockpile for more than a few days. Oil freight rates jumped from $50k to $500k daily.
[E4680] The timeline battle has evolved beyond military degradation tempo. It is now shaped by selective Hormuz flow, freight and insurance stress, replacement difficulty, deadline pressure, and the timing of a dirty forced settlement. Q2 can stay hot even as a settlement path becomes visible because the market is pricing whether a deal arrives fast enough before physical consequences deepen.
[E4690] The conflict's deepest truth: Trump wants a surrender scene more than a forever oil inferno, Iran wants to stop the pain more than prove infinite resolve, mediators want a deal, shippers want flow, importers want relief, producers want stability. Too many forces push against the full catastrophe path. The real path is a brutal middle — not apocalypse, not normal.
[E4688] The base case moved higher because the market spent longer in the friction phase than originally mapped. The artery stayed politically stressed, replacement barrels stayed expensive, and the logistics premium reached deeper into the year — revising up from the original March 7 forecast.
[E4687] The base case outcome path: oil spikes hard (already has), physical system tightens, replacements get expensive, route gets scarred. Then adaptation and coercive settlement arrive before total melt-up. The real path is a 'brutal middle' — not apocalypse, not normal. The acute war premium breaks before year-end because the conflict still looks more likely to end in dirty forced settlement than permanent closure.
[E4681] Base case (55% probability): conflict stays coercive long enough to keep Q2 elevated, but a dirty settlement forms soon enough to break a meaningful part of the acute war premium before year-end. Hormuz flow widens, commercial confidence improves, but escorts and insurance remain elevated. The route functions again but stays politically scarred.
[E4683] Every major power center hates the full collapse outcome: US, Saudi, Gulf, Europe, China, India. Once an outcome becomes intolerable to almost everyone with real power, the system throws countermeasures: escorts, diplomatic pressure, reserve releases, routing changes, exemptions, backchannel deals, emergency guarantees. The market is embedded inside an emergency adaptation machine.
[E4679] SightBringer argues the oil market has transitioned from a 'fear' phase to a 'friction' phase. The question is no longer whether traders are scared but what happens when a politically stressed artery keeps functioning badly enough to distort the replacement chain. Freight is tighter, insurance is higher, replacement barrels are more expensive. Brent at $109.7 understates the physical stress — US crude spot premiums have exploded, and Hormuz is moving through exemptions and political filtering rather than restored commercial trust.
[E4400] West Africa fertilizer shortage threatens agricultural season with long-term repercussions for cocoa and cotton production. ETG's Ashish Lakhotia warns countries are 'severely short on fertilizers' with planting season approaching. Missing the season will have lasting impact on commercial crop exports, a major source of export revenue for the region.
[E4425] Singapore bunkering hub showing supply stress from Middle East war. World's largest bunkering port distributors reducing large purchasing commitments due to extreme price volatility linked to Persian Gulf disruption risks. What happens to Singapore availability and pricing 'ripples across global shipping with immediate effect.' Allied Shipbroking reports unusual caution despite authorities claiming adequate supply.
[E4416] Iran believes it is winning and wants steep price to end war. WSJ reports Iranian regime signaling it has power to impose settlement entrenching Tehran's dominance of Middle East energy resources for decades. Iran denying all US peace overtures — called Trump's 15-point plan 'negotiating with itself.' Time works to Iran's benefit as it has boxed US out of Mideast military bases.
[E4375] Russia actively supporting Iran with phased shipments of drones, medicine, and food expected completed by end of March. Chinese FM voiced opposition to US/Israeli attack, which translates in Chinese political discourse to active backing of Iran. With Russia outproducing all NATO 4-to-1 in Ukraine and China supporting Iran, US faces distinct industrial base disadvantage the longer war continues.
[E4373] West Africa faces critical fertilizer shortage threatening export crops. ETG's head of farm inputs reports governments are 'extremely worried' about securing crop nutrients heading into planting season. Failure to act now means missing the season with 'long-term repercussions' for cocoa and cotton exports.
[E4372] Petrochemical supply shock is accelerating inflation faster than 2020-23 episode. Dow Chemical hiked polyethylene prices 60-100% effective April 1 (from $0.15/lb to $0.30/lb), while LyondellBasell announced $0.35/lb cumulative increases through May. Gromen argues 'he who raises price first and most raises prices best' — second inflation bout will return harder and faster.
[E4371] Taiwan faces existential semiconductor risk from Hormuz closure. Taiwan's grid relies on LNG for 40% of power generation with over one-third of LNG supplied by Qatar. Taiwan's emergency LNG stockpile will last only 11 days, potentially forcing power rationing or electricity cuts to industrial sector including semiconductor fabs.
[E4370] Gromen documents cascading global supply chain breakdowns as Hormuz closure enters fourth week: Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG plant damaged by Iranian missiles, only one LNG cargo still scheduled to arrive in Asia, Airgas declared force majeure on helium March 17, Taiwan's 11-day LNG emergency stockpile threatens semiconductor sector, Australia lowered diesel standards for six months, South Korea implemented 5-day vehicle rotation. IEA called it 'the greatest global energy security threat in history.'
[E4374] Kuwait Petroleum CEO stated full production restoration would take 3-4 months even if war ended today, indicating structural damage to Gulf energy infrastructure extends timeline beyond any ceasefire. Iraq has declared force majeure on foreign-operated oilfields over Hormuz disruption. Slovenia became first EU state to introduce fuel rationing.
[E4355] Natural gas is a major input for nitrogen-based fertilizers, and substantial LNG normally flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Fertilizer stocks are up significantly in 2026. Russia benefits doubly as the world's biggest fertilizer exporter while also producing oil that has risen in price.
[E4322] The war against Iran has run more than two weeks with Strait of Hormuz crossings heavily impaired. The situation is 'notably worse than the base case' — no clear de-escalation path, contradictory statements from US officials, and high-signal military experts 'considerably less optimistic than two weeks ago.' Multiple US-allied Gulf nations are in rough shape as their economies depend on energy flows and luxury tourism.
[E4323] Iran's one-way Shahed 136 drones have been highly effective due to their low cost versus expensive interceptors. Iran's initial counterattacks depleted a significant percentage of US interceptor stockpiles, exposing US industrial base limitations and finite production speed as a military weakness.
[E4324] Wall Street Journal reported Joint Chiefs Chairman warned Trump that attacking Iran could prompt Hormuz closure, but Trump proceeded confident Iran would capitulate before closing the strait. Two weeks in, Iran has not backed down and Hormuz has become 'Tehran's most potent leverage point.'
[E4325] Polymarket places 14% odds oil reaches $150 by end of March 2026, and 33% odds by end of June. Notably, while oil futures trade around $100, Dubai physical swaps are already closer to $140, indicating physical market stress exceeds futures pricing.
[E4272] Iran is allowing selective passage through the Strait of Hormuz — closing it to G7 container and tanker traffic while permitting Asian vessels (85% of energy traffic is for Asia, with China/India/South Asia accounting for ~60%). This reduces immediate supply pressure but prolongs uncertainty. Wood warns that any US attempt to attack Kharg Island via ground troops would trigger major retaliation including pre-laid mines in the Strait.
[E4273] Wood frames the conflict as a potential 'Suez moment' for America — a watershed loss of geopolitical credibility. The longer the Strait remains closed, the more severe the economic damage since 'economic growth is energy consumed.' Markets have been surprisingly calm due to expectations of a Trump pivot (TACO) and the selective passage policy.
[E4310] ASEAN countries like the Philippines are highly vulnerable to the Iran conflict due to oil import dependency and lack of fuel/electricity subsidies. Philippines inflation could exceed 6% in coming months, triggering monetary tightening (policy rate only 4.25%). Indonesia faces fiscal risks with Rp210tn energy subsidies and potential breach of the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit in place since 2003.
[E4191] Cumulative maritime incidents from 01-12 March 2026: 20 verified incidents with 11 killed, 6 injured, and 3 missing. Vessel types affected include 10 tankers, 5 bulk carriers, 3 container ships, 1 tug, and 1 drilling rig. Iraq suspended all oil port operations following the 12 March attack on SAFESEA VISHNU and ZEFYROS near al-Faw. The conflict is systematically degrading regional shipping and port infrastructure.
[E4179] Commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz remained at low single-digit levels on 11 March, with five vessels struck in the heaviest single day of shipping attacks since the war began. Iran deployed approximately a dozen naval mines in the Strait while CENTCOM destroyed 16 Iranian minelaying vessels. Iran has established a selective 'permit regime' granting Bangladesh vessels safe passage rather than a blanket blockade.
[E4183] ADNOC's 922,000 bpd Ruwais refinery — the world's fourth-largest single-site refinery — remained shut as a precaution following the 10 March drone fire. Iraqi southern field production remained at approximately 1.3 million bpd as the Hormuz blockade prevents tanker access. Kuwait's KPC force majeure on crude and refined-product exports continued. The supply disruption is cascading across multiple Gulf producers.
[E4192] The intelligence report documents severe energy infrastructure disruption across the Gulf with global implications. IEA members collectively hold approximately 1.2 billion barrels in public reserves plus 600 million barrels in mandatory commercial stockpiles. Germany, Austria and Japan have already announced partial releases from strategic reserves. Global LNG supply is down approximately 20%, directly impacting import-dependent economies.
[E4180] Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya spokesman warned oil could surge to USD 200 per barrel and declared any vessel or tanker serving the US, Israel, or their partners a legitimate target. Armed forces spokesman added that if Iranian ports are hit, all regional ports and economic centres in the Persian Gulf will be treated as legitimate targets — a major escalation in the scope of potential maritime disruption.
[E4189] Iran struck Salalah Port oil storage facilities in Oman's Dhofar governorate — critically located outside the Strait of Hormuz on the Arabian Sea coast. At least three oil storage tanks caught fire with infrastructure heavily damaged. Maersk confirmed all operations at Port of Salalah paused until further notice. Iran is now hitting energy infrastructure well beyond the Gulf chokepoint, extending the geographic scope of supply disruption.
[E4193] GCC cyberattacks have tripled since the conflict began — a 225% increase in the past week. 45 cyber incidents targeting oil and gas, energy and utilities sectors observed since 28 February. GPS jamming and spoofing affects more than 1,600 vessels in the Gulf transmitting false positions. Iran's nationwide internet blackout continues. Cyber warfare is compounding physical supply chain disruption.
[E4196] JMIC rated overall regional maritime risk as CRITICAL. Major liner and tanker operators maintained suspensions of Gulf port calls. AIS-dark tanker movements continued. The IRGC is now publicly claiming attacks on named vessels and asserting a permit regime for Hormuz transit — a major escalation from the de facto blockade. Iran restarted crude exports through its Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman while restricting competitor access.
[E4231] Specific vessel attacks on 11-12 March: ONE MAJESTY (Japan-flagged, 6,724 TEU) hit with 10cm hull hole; STAR GWYNETH (Marshall Islands, 82,790 DWT) hit with 2-metre hole causing list; MAYUREE NAREE (Thailand, 30,197 DWT) hit by two projectiles with fire, 3 crew missing; SAFESEA VISHNU and ZEFYROS (both tankers in Iraqi waters) attacked by explosive-laden unmanned boat with 1 crew killed. Iraq subsequently suspended all oil port operations.
[E4235] Iran's UN Ambassador claimed more than 1,348 civilians killed and over 17,000 injured in US and Israeli strikes since 28 February. Mass funeral held at Enghelab Square in Tehran on 11 March for senior commanders including General Mousavi (Chief of General Staff), General Pakpour (IRGC Ground Forces Commander), and Aziz Nasirzadeh (Minister of Defence). New Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei made first public appearance. State media claimed attendance exceeded one million.
[E4238] Iraq-Iran border crossings set to gradually reopen. Iraqi airspace closure extended to 13 March with all commercial flights grounded across Baghdad, Erbil, Basra, Sulaimaniyah, and Najaf. Southern Iraqi field production remained at ~1.3M bpd with Basra Oil Terminal in severely constrained mode. The blockade is shutting down Iraqi export capacity through the Gulf, forcing a fundamental rerouting of oil flows.
[E4075] GS finds 10% rise in oil prices would be especially negative for Türkiye and oil importers across Asia, while oil exporters Brazil and Russia likely biggest beneficiaries. GS raised FY26 average core CPI inflation forecast for Japan to 2.1% (from 1.6%) reflecting higher energy prices. GS lowered EA growth forecast and raised EA inflation forecast reflecting higher energy prices amid US-Iran conflict.
[E4074] GS macro section notes oil exports via Strait of Hormuz have ground to near halt based on satellite data. GS base case scenario models 5-week Hormuz disruption. Oil disruptions related to US-Iran conflict pose downside risks to growth and upside risks to inflation. GS lowered 2026 growth forecasts for Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE to reflect disruptions and falling non-oil economic activity.
[E3289] Iran tensions added surface fear to the Bitcoin selloff. Oil spiked and safe havens rotated, but Bitcoin failed to behave like digital gold during this geopolitical stress. This broke 'psychological symmetry' and contributed to narrative discord, weakening Bitcoin's positioning as a safe haven asset.
[E2996] Iran tensions with Israel and the US will remain elevated with military action possible in 2026. Trump warned Tehran on Jan 21 not to resume nuclear program while significant US military assets deploy toward Persian Gulf. Polymarket shows 44% probability of US strikes on Iran by June 30, 2026. Likelihood of regime change has diminished following slowdown in protests.
[E2897] UBS projects agriculture as one of the leading sectors for forward-looking commodity returns in 2026 alongside energy. Sugar and soybean oil specifically highlighted among standout individual commodities, supporting yield-focused strategies.
[E2850] UBS identifies uninterrupted energy flows through Strait of Hormuz as critical — oil flows through the strait equivalent to ~20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. Key risks include Iranian leadership collapse causing output decline, or military action prompting threats to Gulf access. Significant disruption could trigger oil price spike and inflationary pressures.
[E2418] US soybean crush at record pace with monthly crush reaching 225 million bushels (4.2% rise from November, second-highest ever). Year-to-date crushing up 11.5% vs USDA anticipated 5.1% growth. Renewable diesel capacity expansion has strengthened demand for soybeans, canola, and used cooking oil. EPA to finalize biomass-based diesel mandates of 5.2-5.6 billion gallons (~30% increase over 2024).
[E2417] UBS highlights elevated weather-related uncertainties in 2026 as ENSO patterns swing from La Niña to El Niño, traditionally raising climate-related risks. Grain prices are at half-century lows in real terms. Weather or political events pose both risks and opportunities. Short positions across agriculture remain elevated, creating potential for rapid short covering.
[E7413] Gromen argues 'the world will not be able to survive if oil and gas from Russia is subtracted from the global balance of energy supply,' highlighting the fragility of global energy supply to geopolitical disruption. Any cascading supply shock from major producing regions would exacerbate the Peak Cheap Oil thesis and accelerate inflationary pressures.
[E7469] Israel reportedly has only 10-12 days of defensive interceptors remaining while Iran can sustain missile attacks for 5 months. Tom Karako of CSIS stated 'Neither the U.S. nor the Israelis can continue to sit and intercept missiles all day.' Trump stated he'll decide on Iran strikes within two weeks, creating what Gromen calls a potential 'mother of all black swans' scenario. China's rare earth and missile production capabilities give it 'kingmaker' position in the conflict.
[E8263] China's 93% rare earth export reduction forced the Israel-Iran ceasefire by threatening to expose Western military dependence on Chinese materials. Gromen argues China's kingmaker status over global conflicts means the US cannot pursue military escalation against Iran or in the Hormuz theater without Chinese material cooperation.
[E8466] UK cruise missile strikes on Russian naval bases threaten energy weaponization escalation. Russia and OPEC are expected to weaponize oil in response to military provocations, driving prices higher and forcing Treasury selling by oil-importing US creditors, creating a cascading feedback loop between geopolitical conflict and financial market stress.
[E8493] China's deal to purchase Iranian energy at up to 32% discount in non-USD currencies with 2-year payment delays fundamentally undermines US sanctions architecture. Combined with Russia's successful defense of Syria — the first US regime change failure in 30 years — this accelerates the shift toward multi-currency energy pricing and reduces US ability to use energy supply chains as geopolitical leverage.
[E8616] FFTT flags the Israel/Hamas conflict and potential Iran oil sanctions as a critical risk that could drive oil prices higher, making war inflationary. Higher oil prices would force foreign creditors to sell more Treasuries to raise dollars, exacerbating Treasury market dysfunction. This creates a self-reinforcing loop where geopolitical supply shocks undermine the very Treasury stability the Fed is trying to engineer through USD weakness.
[E8656] UN warns of a 60-day food crisis timeline: tens of millions will starve if Ukraine's Odessa port doesn't reopen, creating a cascading supply shock from energy conflict into global food supplies. Author identifies this as an immediate catalyst for further geopolitical and commodity instability.
[E9420] Yale study forecasts Russian oil exports declining from 7.8 mb/d to 2.5 mb/d by end of decade due to sanctions, representing a potential 5.3 mb/d supply loss (10-12% of global net exports). This structural supply removal compounds existing supply deficit concerns and supports the case for an energy supply shock and oil price super spike.
[E8176] Antimony prices have risen 400% since May 2024 after China limited exports in August, signaling military supply pressures and pre-war resource hoarding patterns. Antimony is critical for military applications, and Russia holds the world's second-largest reserves while also threatening commodity export limits. Gromen frames this as evidence of escalating geopolitical risk and potential NATO-Russia conflict.
[E6389] The $400B China-Iran energy partnership deepens strategic ties between the two nations, with China committing to major oil and gas purchases in CNY. This effectively circumvents US sanctions on Iran, strengthens Iran's economic resilience, and complicates any US attempt to maintain pressure through the dollar system or energy chokepoint control.
[E6585] US sanctions on Russian oil companies producing 5% of global supply risk spiking oil prices, creating a cascading supply shock dynamic. The sanctions paradox — where energy supply disruption drives bond yield dysfunction at 4.6-4.8% — illustrates how geopolitical energy disruptions feed back into US financial markets.
[E6645] US depleted nearly 25% of its THAAD interceptor inventory in 12 days of operations against Iran, with 3-8 year replenishment timelines at current production rates of ~100 annually. This rapid stockpile depletion demonstrates the cascading vulnerability created by military engagement in the region.
[E7131] China is helping Iran restock with surface-to-air missiles in response to US military actions and tariff threats, referenced alongside THAAD as key entity. This escalation in China-Iran military cooperation increases the risk of a Hormuz-area supply shock as geopolitical tensions intensify.
[E5620] Israel-Iran conflict creating geopolitical tail risk with potential Strait of Hormuz supply shock. However, strategic depth of US energy reserves and Biden administration positioning to stabilize energy markets could limit crisis impact.